One of the more interesting changes in the FY22 Defense Budget proposal is the U.S. Navy’s cancellation of the JSOW-ER powered glide bomb (nee, cruise missile) and its adoption of the JASSM-ER cruise missile instead. There is, not surprisingly, very little in the way of information currently available on their reasoning. So I thought it would be interesting to analyze the decision in the absence of explicit guidance as to their reasoning. Does this decision make sense? How will it impact military operations over the next decade or so? This is going to be on the long side, because it is analysis not reporting. Let’s dive in.

Much as been written on the People’s Republic of China’s growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capability. A2AD creates a long range bubble in which an adversary’s ships and aircraft are at extreme risk, making it difficult for them to survive to reach their weapons’ release range. Russia is also pursuing an A2AD strategy, though from a purely Naval perspective China’s is more front and center in U.S. Navy (USN) thinking. To summarize things as far as the JSOW-ER discussion goes, China has developed long range anti-ship weapons (including land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles) that requires U.S. Carrier Strike Groups to operate further from Chinese territory in order to retain the relative safety of the vastness of the ocean. Once the Carrier Strike Group starts operating more than a couple of hundred miles from targets its effectiveness starts to deteriorate. At a thousand miles from target transit times, the need to divert fighters from direct combat to acting as tankers, the need for additional escort aircraft (i.e., for electronic warfare or airborne early warning), etc. means you engage very few targets per day. Some see this as the death of the Aircraft Carrier, but of course that is a one-sided look at the problem. The U.S. is in the process of developing numerous weapons systems to allow the Carrier to remain effective at extended ranges. JSOW-ER was one of those technologies.

To understand JSOW-ER we should first look at a taxonomy of weapons. We start with gravity bombs, both unguided and precision guided such as the U.S. JDAM family of GPS-guided bombs. These are dropped/tossed at a target from fairly short range, though tossing them from high altitude does allow for enough range (up to 28km) to avoid short-range air defenses. These are followed by glide bombs, which can have ranges up to 130km. At 130km the launch aircraft is safe from both short and medium range air defenses, and even long range air defenses can struggle to engage them. However extended, very long, or extremely long range air defenses (as well as fighter aircraft) do place the attacking aircraft at risk. As these defensive systems proliferate, even 130km standoff ranges are insufficient until air defenses have been significantly degraded. To operate at longer standoff ranges you need to rely on powered weapons, for our discussion purposes we focus on cruise missiles. Cruise missiles not only allow you to launch weapons from outside the ability of air defenses to threaten the launch aircraft, it extends the overall reach of the aircraft. For example, if you take an aircraft with a 1200km combat radius and equip it with a 500km range cruise missile, you can strike targets 1700km (1050 miles) from the aircraft launch point without needing to refuel the aircraft.

The USN has a number of glide bomb options, but the JSOW-C/C1 (C1) is of most interest to our discussion. The C1 is a 1000lb-class weapon with a 500lb-class warhead. It is actually a dual warhead called BROACH that has one warhead designed to punch a hole in a hardened target (e.g., bunker, ship) that allows a second warhead (designed to have broader area effects) to get inside and detonate. The C1 uses GPS/INS (as well as a data link to obtain targeting updates) to navigate to the target area, then uses infrared terminal guidance to find and strike moving targets including ships. While anti-ship cruise missiles (AShCM) get all the press, the JSOW-C1 is a primary anti-ship weapon for the USN. With a standoff range of 130km even non-stealth aircraft can use it against all but the most high-end naval air defense systems, of which adversaries currently deploy very few. As very long range air defenses and AShCMs proliferate, that 130km range becomes increasingly insufficient for the early days of a war. One can imagine that by 2035, if not 2030 or sooner, it will be necessary to use a lot of weapons with longer ranges to degrade an adversaries defenses before being able to comfortably close within ideal distances to use the C1. Even though the stealthy F-35 could still safely penetrate long range air defenses to use the C1, keeping the Carrier Strike Group at safer distances presents the F-35C with the need for extended weapons release range. The Navy’s initial plans to increase standoff range was to add a small jet engine to the C1, creating the 500km range JSOW-ER.

The JSOW-ER seems like an ideal weapon for the USN for a couple of reasons. First, as an extended range version of the JSOW-C1 it is compatible with the same aircraft, the same logistics system, the same maintenance and handling systems, etc. Bringing it into the fleet is simple and inexpensive compared to developing and adopting an entirely new weapon. The reach of the Carrier’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and F-35Cs would thus be greatly enhanced. Second, the JSOW-C1 is already carried internally by the F-35C and the JSOW-ER was being designed to retain that internal carry capability. So a 1200km combat radius F-35C with a couple of internally carried JSOW-ERs could strike a Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile launch site from a Carrier operating outside the range of the DF-21D.

When one thinks of the F-35 one always thinks of stealth, so a scenario with the F-35C operating in so-called Stealth Mode with internally carried cruise missiles makes a lot of sense. Except of course for one thing, when you are launching weapons from 500km away, how much stealth is really required? For many missions the F-35 can operate in so-called Beast Mode, carrying external weapons that degrade (if not eliminate) its stealth capability. Long range standoff strikes is one such example. So being able to carry the JSOW-ER internally sounds great, but might actually be a very niche capability. And what if 500km is still not as much range extension as one would like? The size restrictions imposed by the F-35 internal weapons may currently seems to preclude longer range cruise missiles. So if you want more range, you need an externally carried weapon. Could the USN adopt both the JSOW-ER and another longer range cruise missile for the Super Hornet and F-35C? Of course, and thus the plot thickens.

At the same time the original JSOW glide bomb program was started by U.S. forces, they started the JASSM stealthy cruise missile program. This is a 370km range, 1000lb warhead weapon. The Navy eventually left the JASSM program in order to develop the SLAM-ER instead. The SLAM-ER had somewhat less range than JASSM, and is not stealthy, but whereas the JASSM was only useful against fixed targets the SLAM-ER was also useful against moving targets and ships. Prior to the introduction of the LRASM, which we will get to in a moment, the SLAM-ER was actually the Navy’s longest range (270km) air-launched anti-ship missile. One great mystery is why once the extended range (925km) JASSM-ER was it not adopted by the Navy. While JASSM-ER does offer extended standoff distances, it once again was only useful for fixed targets.

DARPA pursued a technology demonstration project to see if the JASSM-ER could be turned into an anti-ship missile, and the USN decided to pursue that path to meet an urgent operational need. This became the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM. The LRASM retains a land attack capability but suffers from at least one problem, it is outrageously expensive. Reports have it as around 4x the cost of the JASSM-ER. This might be because of its development as an Urgent Operational Need weapon, where cost is one of the tradeoffs made to cut time from the development cycle. It might also be because of the relatively low production volumes involved, something that continues to be confirmed by the purchase rates in the FY22 budget proposal. Most likely it is both. So while the Navy pursues enough LRASM purchases to meet its short term long range anti-ship missile needs, LRASM does not meet the needs for a longer range land-attack missile to supplement or replace the JSOW-ER.

So if LRASM doesn’t fit the bill for a long range land attack cruise missile, and the Navy is cancelling the JSOW-ER, then what is the Navy’s solution? It is a new variant of the JASSM-ER! The Navy’s JASSM-ER will take the anti-ship features of the LRASM and combine them with the JASSM-ER for a unique variant that meets the Navy’s needs. It may also be the case that this new variant will pick up features from the so-called JASSM-XR program. The JASSM-XR is intended as a longer range, and some say larger warhead, version of the JASSM-ER. Now I find the information on the JASSM-XR program extremely confusing, but in at least one version of the story it would have a range of 1900km. There might actually be two new JASSM-ERs being talked about. One sticks with the form factor of the current AGM-158B, the AGM-158B-2, and the other goes to a potentially larger missiles called the AGM-158D. What the features of the 158B-2 are is anyone’s guess at this point, but there are clues. For example, years ago there was a contract for design of a new wing for the JASSM-ER that would yield some modest range extension. Some have associated this with the JASSM-XR program, though it may have been independent of that. So the 158B-2 might have some range extension but not a larger warhead or nearly the range that have been attributed to the JASSM-XR. So just what is the 158B-2, and how does it relate to the Navy’s adoption of the JASSM-ER? Or just what are the capabilities of the Navy JASSM-ER? Only time will tell. But it is clear that the Navy will be buying a cruise missile with a range at least double that of the JSOW-ER. And that greatly increases is standoff capabilities against A2AD environments.

The one things that the switch from the JSOW-ER to the JASSM-ER gives up is internal carry in the F-35C. There has been speculation from time to time that a reshaped JASSM-ER. along with modifications to the F-35 weapons bay, would allow for internal carry. But that is a lot of expense and disruption for a likely unneeded (at least in the foreseeable future) capability. You don’t need extreme stealth at 1000km weapons release range. What if the F-35 does need greater standoff range weapons for internal carry at a future point? First, it is getting some, like the AARGM-ER/SiAW that extends ranges to the 200-300km area. But if the Navy were to decide it wanted more range and larger warhead it could purchase the air-launched variant of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) that it is already purchasing for ship-launch, the Joint Strike Missile (JSM). Comparison of the JSM and JSOW-ER options may have helped the Navy make this decision, since even if internal carry is eventually a priority the JSM is likely the better option. In the meantime, the U.S. Navy is getting the extended range strike capability that they really need.